

CONFERENCE OF THE TEN NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 24 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

(United States)

63-15795

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil;

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. M.J. DESAI

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKIY
Mr. M.V. ANTYASOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-sixth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): At our meeting of 17 May, after we had listened to the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, speaking on the NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact, I promised (ENDC/PV.133, pp.16-18) to give his statement careful study and to answer him at an appropriate time. On the same occasion you yourself, Mr. Chairman, as representative of the United States, also referred (ibid., pp.33-35) to my remarks on the same subject. May I put forward today a few remarks on those statements?

I shall refer first of all to the speech of the representative of Canada. I must confess that what struck me most while listening to it was that the Canadian delegation did not provide any new argument on either the substance of the matter or the procedure to be followed. It was a mere repetition of statements familiar to the members of this Committee. That spares me the trouble of reverting to each of Mr. Burns' points. I should like to dwell on just one aspect of his statement on behalf of the Canadian delegation.

I have in mind the contention, repeated once more at that time, concerning the alleged incompetence of this Committee to examine the proposal (ENDC/77) on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the States signatories to the Warsaw Treaty. Indeed, in his statement Mr. Burns told us that the Western delegations had been against discussing the draft non-aggression pact in the Committee of Eighteen from the very beginning of the present stage of our negotiations. He said:

"Since the very beginning of the present round of negotiations the Western representatives have maintained that this Conference was not an appropriate forum for considering a non-aggression pact." (ENDC/PV.133, p.17)

I find that statement by the representative of Canada significant. It is significant, first of all, because it clarifies the Western stand concerning the history of the issue, and secondly because it contains an inaccuracy. With reference to the history of the issue, the words "Since the very beginning of the present round of negotiations" are significant. They reveal that a change has occurred in the attitude of certain representatives of the Western Powers to the proposal to conclude the pact, and that it was a change in the wrong direction.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

I stress the words "the present round of negotiations". Let me explain: there was a time when we did not hear any objection from any of the representatives of the Western Powers, the representative of Canada included, to discussing that proposal within the framework of our Committee. To illustrate that, may I recall one single fact? On 2 April 1962 the Committee of the Whole adopted the "Agreed recommendations by the co-Chairmen on arrangements for discussion of proposals in the Committee of the Whole" (ENDC/C.1/2). Among other measures, the Soviet Union then proposed the "Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty". That proposal was listed in the agenda of the Committee. Here I quote the last paragraph of our decision of 2 April 1962.

"The Co-Chairmen will in future examine and submit, in the light of paragraph 2 of the procedure of work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee^{1/}, agreed recommendations regarding further discussion, including priority, of the proposals which have already been or may be made by members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee." (ibid.)

Therefore, in the light of our decision of 2 April 1962, the contentions concerning the alleged incompetence of our Conference to examine the draft pact cannot have any substantial significance. They only indicate that in the meantime a change, a 180-degree shift, has occurred in the attitude of certain Western delegations, the Canadian delegation included.

What are the reasons for such a change? For what reason the representative of Canada considers now that this forum is not appropriate for discussing the draft pact we have not as yet been able to discover. We have not yet received explanations with sufficient grounds to require this Committee's attention.

Taking into account such changes in the stand of the Canadian delegation and other Western delegations, we shall not be astonished if we are told now, purely and simply, that the issue is not on the agenda. But that could not change the essence of the matter, the facts themselves. It is a fact that none of the Western delegations opposed the inclusion of this issue in the agenda. That the issue is on the agenda, that it is within the compass of this Committee, has been unequivocally admitted by the United Kingdom delegation. I am referring to the statement of the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, on 20 February 1963, when he said:

1/ ENDC/1/Add.1

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"Mr. Kuznetsov today has proposed and has indeed submitted the draft (ENDC/77) of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This matter is, of course, already on the agenda for consideration in the Committee of the Whole, and I think that is probably the appropriate place in which it should be considered." (ENDC/PV.100, p.44)

That statement by Mr. Godber shows that Mr. Burns committed an inaccuracy when he stated that --

"Since the very beginning of the present round of negotiations the Western representatives have maintained that this Conference was not an appropriate forum for considering a non-aggression pact." (ENDC/PV.133, p.17)

At least one of the Western delegations present here -- the delegation of the United Kingdom -- took a different stand from that attributed by Mr. Burns to all Western delegations. And when Mr. Burns contends that --

"What we do not propose to do is to address ourselves to the substance of the Soviet proposal, and that is because we are convinced that this Conference is not an appropriate forum..." (ibid.)

-- I should only like to tell him that we are of a completely different opinion, based on an objective analysis of the situation and on political and legal considerations, as well as on the assessments made by important Western delegations. We believe that what upsets the Canadian delegation is not the negotiating forum but the substance itself of the proposal regarding the non-aggression pact.

Here I should like to address a question to the representative of Canada. Supposing for the sake of argument that this proposal were considered in another body and not in our Committee, would the Canadian delegation agree to the conclusion of a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact? In other words, does the Canadian delegation agree that the obligations proposed in the Soviet draft pact should be undertaken -- that is, that the countries members of the two organizations should not, in their mutual relationship, resort to the use or threat of force, but should settle international differences exclusively by peaceful means?

I should like now, Mr. Chairman, to say a few words about the answer you gave as representative of the United States, to the first of the questions (ENDC/PV.127, p.12) asked by me at our meeting on 3 May. I do not intend to speak now on the essence of that answer; at this stage I only want to comment briefly on that part of your statement in which you said that --

"The representative of Romania made an effort ... to draw out of context remarks made by President Kennedy." (ENDC/PV.133, p.34)

In order to substantiate that assessment, you continued as follows:

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"The President in his interview discussed many subjects and I hope and believe that Mr. Macovescu has read the full text of that interview. He must therefore realize that President Kennedy, in responding to various questions asked by Mr. Adzhubei, was indicating that there were various steps that could be of value. Some of those steps would be of value by themselves. A non-aggression pact was not one of those. The true spirit of the President's remarks is contained in an earlier part of that same interview, and I urge Mr. Macovescu to read it again. I am referring to the following comment by the President:

"I think we should have not only an agreement between our countries, but take those steps which make peace possible. I don't think that paper, and words on paper, are as significant as looking at those areas which provide tension between our two systems and seeing if we can dispel that tension."

"I submit that that is the real gist of the President's remarks." (ibid., p.35)

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I not only read the text of President Kennedy's interview in its entirety but also studied it carefully. Nevertheless, following your kind and solicitous suggestion, I re-read it. And what was the conclusion I reached? I reached the conclusion that the attempt to draw out of context remarks made by President Kennedy can be attributed to the United States delegation, and by no means to the delegation of Romania. On this score the very statements made by President Kennedy are conclusive testimony.

Three points in President Kennedy's interview are of consequence in this matter. First, Mr. Kennedy stated:

"I think that the Soviet Union and the United States should live together in peace. We are large countries, energetic people; we are steadily providing in both our countries an increase in the standard of living. If we can keep the peace for twenty years, the life of the people of the Soviet Union and the life of the people of the United States will be richer and will be far happier as the standard of living steadily rises."

So the general prerequisite from which the President proceeds is that "the Soviet Union and the United States should live together in peace".

Secondly, here is another element in Mr. Adzhubei's talk with President Kennedy. Mr. Adzhubei asked:

"Mr. President, what is your attitude toward the idea of concluding a pact of peace between the United States and the Soviet Union? ..."

In my opinion that was a clear and precise question, and the President answered:

"I think we should have not only an agreement between our countries, but take those steps which make peace possible. I don't think that paper, and words on paper, are as significant as looking at those areas which provide tension between our two systems and seeing if we can dispel that tension."

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

That part of the interview cannot be construed as denying the usefulness of a peace pact between the United States and the Soviet Union. The President said that such a document would not be "as significant as" the adoption of other measures --- something which we do not dispute either. It is obvious, as we have emphasized on several occasions -- for instance on 29 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.115, p.10) --, that a non-aggression pact does not in itself represent a reflexion of ideal international relations. It would undoubtedly be highly desirable that we be in a position to conclude pacts that might reflect and promote relations with an ampler, richer and more elevated content. But as long as international relations are as at present, and precisely in order to facilitate their improvement, a non-aggression pact would obviously have great usefulness. The part of President Kennedy's statement which I have quoted is consonant with this prerequisite of his interview as recalled here.

Thirdly, with regard to the NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact itself, President Kennedy stated:

"I think it would be helpful if NATO and Warsaw Pact engaged in a commitment to live in peace with each other."

All those quotations can be found in United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1961, pp. 650, 652 and 655.

The words "I think it would be helpful" round off the construction placed by us on the President's statement in my second point.

The statement made by you, Mr. Chairman, as United States representative, as well as my earlier statements and the one I am delivering today, are all before this Committee. The members of our Committee are in a position to judge for themselves the correctness of the way President Kennedy was quoted by the United States delegation and by the Romanian delegation.

So much for that point. Those comments spring from my desire to induce you not to abstain from answering my other three questions. Perhaps it would be of some help if, before giving the requested answers, you would again look through President Kennedy's interview. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, may I urge you to read the interview again?

Before ending my statement today I should like to remind the United Kingdom representative of a promise made by Mr. Godber on 20 February of this year. At that time, commenting on the Soviet draft non-aggression pact submitted by Mr. Kuznetsov, Mr. Godber said:

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"I would tell him that I shall study with the greatest interest the draft he has submitted, and that my Government is certainly not opposed to the conclusion of an agreement of non-aggression between the signatories of the two pacts if it will prove helpful." (ENDC/PV.100. p.44)

I should like also to remind him that in fact the United Kingdom Government seems to have been studying this idea for more than four years. May I be allowed to read into the record some of the statements made by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, on the matter? On 2 March 1959, while he was visiting the Soviet Union, Mr. Macmillan stated at a reception in the Kremlin:

"On one matter -- your suggestion of a non-aggression pact -- I would just say that, as I told you earlier today, I am prepared to declare at once our agreement that:

- "(a) in all matters of dispute our two countries should act in the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter;
- "(b) neither Government should seek unilaterally to prejudice the rights, obligations and vital interests of the other;
- "(c) on the basis of these principles, our Governments agree that disputes should be settled by negotiation and not by force.

"This in no way prejudices our firm resolution to stand by our defensive alliance until the happy time comes when the world can give up these protective measures." (New York Times, 3 March 1959)

I do not intend to comment on some of the elements contained in this statement which to my mind are liable to criticism. The main point is that the statement is in favour of the idea of a non-aggression pact.

The United Kingdom-Soviet communiqué of 3 March 1959, after listing the problems approached during the talks, stated:

"In relation to all these matters, the Prime Ministers endorse the principle that differences between nations should be resolved by negotiation and not by force." (New York Times, 4 March 1959)

Addressing the House of Commons on 4 March 1959 Mr. Macmillan stated, inter alia:

"But the main point is that on these wider problems we reached agreement that the great issues which separate East and West must be settled by negotiation."

In connexion precisely with the non-aggression pact, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated on that occasion:

"In the time available, we were not able to agree on the terms of a declaration. These will be the subject of further discussion between our Governments." (Official Report, 4 March 1959, cols. 449-450)

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

In the light of those statements by the Prime Minister and of Mr. Godber's promise, I should like to end my statement today by asking the following questions:

Has the United Kingdom delegation concluded its study of the draft NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact?

Is the United Kingdom delegation now in a position to make known the conclusions it has reached as a result of that study?

The Romanian delegation considers these questions and those posed to the delegations of the United States and Canada, as well as the answers we are expecting, as integral parts of this Committee's work on collateral measures. Representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, it is your turn.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Speaking as representative of the United States, I should like first to assure the Romanian representative, in connexion with the statement he has just made, that I shall be more than glad to heed his kind and solicitous suggestion that I should re-read President Kennedy's interview. I am glad to learn that the Romanian representative subscribes to an opinion which I hold: that the statements of the President of the United States are well worth re-reading. If I might in turn ask the Romanian representative to re-read the statement of mine to which he was good enough to refer, I think he might find that it contains sufficient answers to the questions he has posed to my Delegation.

For well over one month we in this Committee have been devoting our Friday meetings to a consideration of collateral measures: that is, measures directed at reducing international tension, promoting confidence among States, and facilitating the subsequent agreement on general and complete disarmament which we are seeking. I believe we have all recognized that the immediate object of our endeavours at these Friday meetings is substantially more modest than our work on Wednesdays, because on Wednesdays we are trying to thrash out the much more difficult problems involved in a treaty on general and complete disarmament. By the same token, there would seem to be some basis for hoping that the more modest subjects which we deal with on Fridays would be capable of reaching fruition more rapidly than would seem to be possible in regard to a full understanding on general disarmament.

(The Chairman, United States)

Our experience here on Fridays since April has been marked by agreement in principle on one collateral measure: the direct communications link between the Soviet Union and the United States (ENDC/PV.118, p.52). There has been no agreement on any other measure, in spite of the fact that there have been a number of additional proposals from both the Eastern and the Western delegations.

We would think that there is a lesson in that. At least, as we see it, it would appear from our experience that collateral measures will have little chance of being accepted, and thus of contributing to the building of confidence and the reduction of tensions, unless they take genuine account of the interests of each side as those interests exist in today's admittedly imperfect world.

We submit that each side is entirely capable of judging its own interests and of determining how any specific proposals put forward by other delegations will affect those interests. Of course, it is possible for one country to be mistaken in its judgements, particularly in its initial judgements. That means that a certain amount of explanation may be useful and indeed necessary to ensure that all of us have a full understanding of the suggested terms and probable consequences of each proposal. However, it is illusory to think that, once a full understanding has been reached, there is any possibility for one side to browbeat the other into accepting an obviously inappropriate, untimely or unfair measure merely by constant speeches, polemics and invective. Such statements merely degenerate into propaganda, which, as the representative of Sweden said at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.135, p.33), cannot make any impression upon the delegations here. Indeed, I might add that, even as propaganda documents, such statements undoubtedly also have very little, if any, influence outside this council chamber.

As far as the United States is concerned, we have conscientiously attempted to approach the problem of collateral measures with the aim of achieving the first agreements of our Conference. Because we recognize the tense and distrustful state of international relations today, we have not deluded ourselves into thinking that the first steps in this area could be far-reaching. Rather we have deliberately sought to advance suggestions which would not touch upon sensitive political issues for each side but which would try to reduce the risks and dangers inherent in the existing situation. That does not mean that we do not foresee the possibility of still other collateral measures in the future which will advance us further towards reducing world frictions; but to us it is clear that first things must come first.

(The Chairman, United States)

In that sense we do not consider our proposal for a high-level communications link (ENDC/70, p.10) and the Soviet acceptance of it in principle (ENDC/PV.118, p.52) to be either a victory for us or a concession from the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it is merely a measure which had long been discussed in circles interested in disarmament matters and which we happened to put forward first here. We believe that the Soviet Union had undoubtedly been considering the idea even before its official submission by the United States delegation at this Conference, and the Soviet Government undoubtedly recognized it as a useful, though limited, measure whose adoption could benefit both sides.

We take the same attitude towards the other two proposals which we have actively promoted here in connexion with the reduction of the risk of war. I am referring to our suggestions for an exchange of special military missions on a bilateral basis between our Governments, and arrangements for advance notification of certain major military movements (ENDC/70, pp.4-6). Those are measures which have also been widely discussed in public. In putting them forward my delegation makes no claim to great wisdom or initiative; it merely wishes to ensure that no possibility for creating a somewhat more stable international environment is overlooked.

We cannot, of course, do anything to realize those proposals if the Soviet Union adamantly adheres to its initial reaction to them, which, for reasons still unclear to us, was negative. However, as I have noted at recent meetings, some past statements by the delegations of the Soviet Union and its allies have led us to suspect that there might be some misunderstanding of the nature and purposes of those two proposals. For that reason we have devoted considerable effort and time to an attempt to explain the items to the fullest extent in the hope that it would lead to their reconsideration by the Soviet Union.

It should be obvious that we are not motivated in the slightest by tactical considerations or a desire for propaganda advantage. We realize there is no great emotional or political appeal in such admittedly prosaic proposals as advance notification and the exchange of missions; but we believe the two measures have interest because of their innate value to both sides.

In the past two or three weeks or so, since we renewed our efforts to get across to the Eastern delegations the full meaning of our proposals, we have not had any indication, in either a negative or a positive sense, that a second look at the utility of those measures might be taking place on the Soviet side. We earnestly hope,

(The Chairman, United States)

however, that such a re-examination is in fact under way and is taking into account all of the clarifications we have given concerning the safeguards which will guarantee against any abuses and which will ensure substantial reciprocal benefit. In this spirit we trust that we shall not be disappointed when we next hear from our Soviet colleague on the subject.

We wish it were possible to say that the Soviet Union had approached the problem of collateral measures from the same objective point of view that we submit we have taken. Unfortunately, however, all we can see in the various proposals put forward by the Eastern side is an attempt to stir emotions, to make propaganda and to achieve unilateral advantages for the Soviet bloc.

In one instance, in the proposal (ENDC/75) for banning strategic nuclear delivery vehicles from foreign bases, we are confronted with a Soviet attempt to impose nuclear disarmament unilaterally upon Western Europe while the Soviet Union, nearby, is placed under no limitations even though its territory is loaded with similar weapons, many of which are pointed directly at Western Europe. In his speech a week ago the representative of Poland (ENDC/PV.133 p.27) admitted the one-sided nature of this scheme and tried to justify it by pointing out that there are precedents for international agreements which called for actions mainly by one of the parties to the agreement. It is quite apparent, however, from the examples he gave, that in each case of such one-sided action the government involved undertook the commitment because it felt that from a broad point of view the agreement would be to its advantage as well as to that of the other party or parties. But that is not at all the case here, since no conceivable benefit would accrue to the West from the dangerously one-sided modification of the existing world military balance which would result from the Soviet proposal on bases.

Finally, in its advocacy of the immediate conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty States (ENDC/77), the Soviet Union, even though not proposing a measure leading to military inequality, is nevertheless trying to foist on to our agenda a political proposal which has no place in our deliberations. The Eastern delegations, by their proposal of a non-aggression pact, have been trying to involve this Conference, we submit quite inappropriately, in the most delicate European political questions and, indeed, to induce this Conference to pronounce itself, at least indirectly, in favour of Soviet positions with regard to this geographical region. Obviously this is not an appropriate item for us to concern ourselves with here in this Conference.

(The Chairman, United States)

If we were to seek one common thread or theme running through these and other Soviet bloc proposals on collateral measures, we would not find what we might hope to find: that is, a constructive effort to calm down the tensions that prevail between East and West. In fact, unfortunately, we see an opposite tendency, the apparent aim of stirring up emotions and passions by indulgence in all sorts of wild, unfounded accusations against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, in particular, against one of its members, the Federal Republic of Germany.

Last year, when this Committee was at one point discussing a possible declaration against war propaganda, the Soviet delegation was fond of telling us that the Western countries should follow the Soviet example in enacting legislation to prohibit war propaganda. To this we can only say that the existence of such laws on the statute books of the Eastern European countries has not in the least prevented them from trying to arouse their peoples, through the one-sided presentation of news and through the active distortion of developments, to hate the people and Government of another country namely Western Germany. Entirely irresponsible stories have been spread, and on occasion manufactured, about the alleged aggressive intentions of NATO, of supposed Western German desires to start a nuclear war -- which I may say parenthetically is on its face a logical absurdity in this day of nuclear weapons -- and of a desire by the Federal Republic to pursue its policies by the use of force. Free use has been made here of epithets about NATO and Germany, such as "militaristic", "aggressive", "Hitlerite", "revenge-seeking", "imperialistic", and so forth.

In the beginning this abusive propaganda was largely restricted to our Friday meetings on collateral measures; but more recently it has spilt over into Monday meetings on the test ban and Wednesday discussions of general and complete disarmament. The speech two days ago of the representative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.135, pp.33 et seq.), in which he distorted the history surrounding the founding of NATO, is one instance of such polemics.

I think that the sequence of events in European history after the Second World War is quite well known to everyone who has had free access to the facts. While the United States demobilized its forces in 1945 and 1946 to minimal levels and drastically cut its defence expenditures, that did not happen in proportionate measure in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, Soviet military strength was maintained and military force was used to achieve political objectives in Europe. The Soviet attempts to use

(The Chairman, United States)

force to drive the Western allies from their lawful position in Berlin in 1948 took place a year before NATO was founded.

Indeed, it was those very efforts which brought NATO into being in 1949 as a free and spontaneous partnership among the free countries of Europe, in association with the United States and Canada, to organize jointly their self-defence. The purpose of those countries was to ensure that they would avoid the fate of those nations which, in the period before NATO was organized, fell one by one under Soviet domination. Since that time the countries of Western Europe and NATO have successfully preserved their freedom and national independence without changing the purely defensive character of the alliance.

Naturally, in the present circumstances of the continued build-up of Soviet military strength in missiles and nuclear weapons as well as in more conventional armaments, the NATO governments have no choice but to take measures which will be equally effective in preserving the defensive strength of NATO by ensuring its modernization and the effective deployment of that defensive strength. The Soviet Union and its allies, by their various one-sided propaganda proposals, would evidently like to keep the NATO forces from improving their defence capacity at the same time that the Soviet bloc would be put under no such limitations, and at a time when the Soviet bloc is in fact straining every muscle, even at the price of admitted domestic economic hardship, to attempt to achieve military superiority. After all, it was Chairman Khrushchev himself who said, in a speech about three months ago, that for the Soviet Union cannon would have to take precedence over butter. We in the West have no choice but to believe the Head of the Soviet Government when he speaks in those terms, and to take the necessary defensive military measures for our own security.

The way out of this situation cannot be found through propaganda, polemics, false accusations or one-sided proposals. It can only come from an honest effort to work out a disarmament plan which is equitable to all, realistic in its political approach and sound in its structure. In the meantime, the role of collateral measures, if we are to be successful in agreeing upon them, is to reduce tensions and build confidence, not to inflame emotions still further. To reduce tensions and to build confidence is the essence of the approach taken by the United States in its proposals for reducing the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.

(The Chairman, United States)

We are happy that the Soviet Union has recognized in principle the value of reducing the risk of accidental war by a failure of communications. We now hope that the Soviet Union will appreciate equally well the desirability of other collateral measures for reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. It is to that end that we urge the Soviet delegation to begin to discuss seriously with us -- informally and privately if it so prefers -- the two collateral measures which we have proposed.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): In my statement today I should like first of all to express the point of view of the Czechoslovak delegation in regard to certain aspects of one of the most important measures aimed at reducing the danger of a nuclear war: the draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). At several meetings of the Committee the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has already explained very clearly and in detail the reasons which led the USSR to submit this draft. A number of other delegations, including the delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, have also convincingly shown the appropriateness and significance of such a measure for achieving progress in the cause of disarmament.

But the delegations of the NATO countries stubbornly refuse to consider this draft, and put forward all kinds of arguments in support of their negative attitude. In particular they assert -- as, for instance, the United States representative has just stated again today -- that the adoption of this declaration would give a unilateral military advantage to the socialist countries (supra, p.14). The delegation of the socialist countries have already on more than one occasion refuted convincingly all such objections and assertions.

No one can deny that the implementation of this declaration would place all the parties to it in an equal position, since they would all assume the same obligations. Its adoption would be a substantial contribution to the cause of restoring confidence in the relations between States and reducing the danger of a nuclear conflict. It would in no way lead to weakening the security of the NATO countries, as the representatives of the Western Powers are again trying to convince us. It would be quite easy to quote here statements made by United States Government leaders to the effect that they

(Mr. Šimovič, Czechoslovakia)

have on their own national territory nuclear missiles and weapons which in quantity, power, range and speed are adequate to ensure the defence and security of the United States as well as its allies.

If the United States, according to its own assertion, has on its own territory nuclear missile weapons which, as its military experts emphasize, are sufficient to deliver a so-called second strike in the event of a nuclear conflict, then the objections that the assumption of the obligations laid down in this declaration would weaken the security of the NATO countries thereby lose all significance. Thus it turns out that at the present time bases for strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on territories of other States are not at all necessary for ensuring their security.

This being so, the question arises why the NATO member States so stubbornly oppose the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories in general and, in particular, bases for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It should not be surprising to anyone that the negative attitude of the delegations of the NATO countries towards this draft declaration undoubtedly leads us to the conclusion that military bases, and, in particular, bases for strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons on foreign territories, occupy an important place in the aggressive military and strategic concepts of NATO, and particularly of the United States.

The purpose of the efforts of the delegations of the NATO countries to prove the alleged one-sidedness of the draft declaration is merely an attempt to conceal the fact that the creation of bases for strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons has been and still is a unilateral process of bringing the means of aggression closer to the borders of the countries of the socialist camp so as to bring about a military advantage on the side of the Western Powers. This is a system designed for political blackmail and for facilitating delivery of a surprise attack, a system which has played an important part in creating and maintaining a war psychosis in the NATO countries, which is necessary in order to justify the further intensification of the arms race.

In studying the arguments advanced by the delegations of the NATO countries against the draft declaration, one can only be amazed at the peculiarity of their logic when they try to prove the alleged one-sidedness of the declaration. If one is to speak at all of one-sidedness, then it would be more appropriate to take a look from this standpoint at the present situation, in which, as a result of long-term unilateral measures, the governments of the United States and its allies have created a whole system

of aggressive NATO bases all round the borders of the socialist countries, including bases for strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. No one can deny that the existence of these bases creates a threat not only to the socialist countries, but also to the countries on whose territory they are located. Military bases on foreign territories are a direct threat to peace and security throughout the world. Logic requires that this existing one-sidedness should be eliminated in the first place, or that the Western Powers, as they say in our country, should first sweep before their own doorstep.

Consequently, as we have already repeatedly shown, their security would not at all suffer as a result of adoption of the declaration; on the contrary, the peoples and peace throughout the world would gain immeasurably.

The United States delegation has submitted to our Committee a project of measures (ENDC/70) which, in its opinion, would reduce the risk of war through accident. We note with surprise that, in drafting this project, the United States did not include a demand for the liquidation of foreign bases for strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, the implementation of which would be more important for the prevention of war through accident than any other measure it has proposed. The present system of bases with strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons in constant combat readiness, in view of their remoteness from the political centre, and in view of the great danger of misunderstanding or misinterpreting an order, a breakdown in communications, or simply -- as the British military theoretician, Liddell Hart, wittily said a short while ago -- the possibility of a correct order being read with Nelson's blind eye, is fraught with very serious elements of the risk of war through accident.

The whole course of our discussion so far has shown that the objections of the Western Powers to the draft declaration, and in particular their assertions about its alleged one-sidedness, are devoid of any real or objective foundation. The facts show that, if one desires to find a businesslike and objective approach to this question, it is impossible to come to the conclusions which the Western Powers are trying to impose on the Committee.

The Czechoslovak delegation believes that the adoption of this declaration would be a significant step in our efforts to ensure lasting peace. What is proposed here is a concrete measure which would not be prejudicial to either side, a measure which, in addition to its military significance, would be of political importance and would lead

(Mr. Šimovič^V, Czechoslovakia)

to a reduction of international tension. It would also be an important step towards the implementation of other collateral measures, including the creation of demuclearized zones in various parts of the world, which has been advocated by a number of representatives on our Committee, and the creation of a favourable atmosphere for the elaboration of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In the next part of my statement I consider it necessary to speak about that part of the statement made by the representative of Canada at the meeting of the Committee held on 17 May, in which he reproached the representatives of the socialist countries for pointing out that the policy of the militarist circles of the Federal Republic of Germany constituted a danger to peace. Mr. Burns said:

" I regret that the representative of the Soviet Union and his colleagues have introduced unnecessary polemics into our debates ... " (ENDC/PV.133, p.18)

From time to time other representatives of the NATO countries speak in the same vein, as did, for example, the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, at our last meeting (ibid.)

In trying to defend the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Burns stated that there were no grounds for concern, since under the Paris Agreement of 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany "... has undertaken not to manufacture nuclear, chemical or biological weapons." (ENDC/PV.133, p.18). In this connexion I should like to emphasize that neither the Czechoslovak people nor the Czechoslovak Government harbour any hostile feelings towards the people of the Federal Republic of Germany. We should like to establish and maintain with the Federal Republic of Germany the same relations as we have with other States. It is not our fault if our repeated proposals to normalize our relations with the Federal Republic of Germany have so far met with no response from it. But we can in no case disregard the developments which are taking place in the Federal Republic of Germany close to our Western border and which constitute a serious threat to security in Europe and throughout the world.

But let us turn to the Paris Agreement of 1954. As we know, its provisions relate only to the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, but the Federal Republic of Germany can, either directly or through the West German monopolies, manufacture weapons of mass destruction or participate in the production of such weapons in any other country. Moreover, the prohibition on production does not apply to research or to the development of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or of aggressive nuclear

missiles; nor -- what must be especially emphasized -- does it exclude the possibility of acquiring such weapons from other States.

Mr. Burns coyly passes over in silence the fact that, under pressure from the Federal Republic of Germany, the Agreement itself has been revised several times in some of its provisions. As a result of these changes the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany today possess a number of means of combat which under the original text of the Paris Agreement should never have become part of their armaments. It is an obvious fact that, despite the Paris Agreement, the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany are systematically trying to obtain in any possible form control, participation in decisions and, finally, direct possession of nuclear weapons, since they see in these weapons the means for achieving their military and political aims. Do not these tactics of gradually advancing new aims, which the West German militarists and generals of the Bundeswehr are using, bring to mind the tactics of Hitler's Reichswehr in the thirties during the preparation of its aggression against the peoples of Europe?

At first the West German military circles tried to acquire at least tactical nuclear weapons. This demand was openly formulated in the well known memorandum of the general staff of the Bundeswehr of August 1960. The objective of acquiring tactical nuclear weapons has not changed since the resignation of Defence Minister Strauss. In February this year the new Defence Minister, Mr. von Hassel, stated that he --

" ... shares the opinion of Mr. Strauss that the Bundeswehr, down to division level, must be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons."
(UPI, 20 February 1963).

What have been the results of these efforts? Today already certain Bundeswehr units possess various types of means of delivery of tactical nuclear weapons, and some types of such weapons are already being manufactured by the Federal Republic itself or with the help of its allies. As for the nuclear warheads for these weapons, their transfer into the hands of former Hitlerite generals in the event of a conflict is a matter of a very short time. A large number of Bundeswehr members have attended United States long-term training courses and have been trained in the waging of nuclear war. These dangerous measures have been taken in full accordance with the will of the United States and with its support. This was confirmed by Mr. Robert McNamara,

United States Secretary of Defense, at a session of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services on 19 February 1963, when he said:

"... with nuclear-capable weapon systems we have provided training in the use of these weapons to a large number of Allied military personnel ... We are making every possible effort to keep our NATO partners fully informed of the problems of nuclear war..." (Hearings-Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, H.R. 2440/S.843, p.27).

But that is not all. The nuclear obsession which had taken hold of the leading personalities of the Federal Republic of Germany, after the first attempts to acquire tactical nuclear weapons, began to be focussed on strategic nuclear weapons, the possession of which was claimed to be one of the basic attributes of the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany. Permit me to quote from a statement by the former German Minister of Defence, Mr. Strauss, which he made at the University of Georgetown towards the end of 1961. I quote this from the Bulletin des Presse-und-Informationssamtes der Bundesregierung, 1 December 1961:

"The point is that the possession of and the right to use nuclear weapons must become the symbol and even the characteristic feature, the decisive criterion of sovereignty."

That concept was fully confirmed early this year by Mr. Strauss's successor, Mr. von Hassel, who added, according to Die Welt of 21 February 1963, that the Bundeswehr needed also "long-range means of delivery of nuclear weapons."

That is why the government circles of the Federal Republic of Germany show such interest in the creation of a NATO multinational and multilateral nuclear force, in which in the present circumstances they see a convenient way of arriving, first, at least at control and participation in joint decisions concerning nuclear weapons, and finally at the possession of nuclear weapons.

We are therefore fully justified in asserting that the creation of a NATO multilateral force constitutes a serious threat to peace. That has been clearly shown in the statement of the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 17 May 1963 (ENDC/88), with which I had the honour to acquaint the Committee at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.135, pp.14 et seq.)

Participation in a NATO multilateral force, however, is not the only way in which the West German militarists are gaining access to nuclear weapons. They have other cards to play. In this connexion I should like to recall the recently-signed treaty of co-operation between the Federal Republic of Germany and France, which is doubtless

well known to members of the Committee. Among other things, that treaty provides for close collaboration between the two countries in the military field. Article II (B, 3) (Defence) clearly states:

"With regard to armaments the two Governments will endeavour to organize work in common from the stage of drawing up appropriate armament plans and of the preparation of plans of financing them". (Current History, April 1963, p.238)

It is worth noting that the treaty does not contain the slightest mention of the Paris Agreement to which Mr. Burns referred.

Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Federal Republic of Germany, like France, for example, might in certain circumstances start manufacturing its own nuclear weapons. There already exist certain scientific and technical prerequisites for the production of fissionable materials for military purposes as a result of the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in Euratom and its co-operation with France, as well as on account of the construction of its own installations. As for financial expenditure, there is no limit to the amount that the government circles of the Federal Republic would be prepared to spend in order to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as possible.

When we point out these dangerous developments in the Federal Republic of Germany, the representatives of Western Powers try to convince us that the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO and its multilateral nuclear force amounts to a guarantee that it will not have direct access to the possession of nuclear weapons and that, in regard to their use, it will be under the control of its NATO partners. But whom do you wish to convince with such arguments? Today already the question arises: who is actually controlling whom within NATO? The Federal Republic of Germany is bearing a considerable part of NATO expenditure, and proposes to cover up to 40 per cent of the cost of creating the NATO multilateral nuclear surface fleet. Hundreds of Hitler's former generals and officers occupy key positions in NATO, and their number is steadily growing. At the present time the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany form the largest contingent of NATO's picked armed forces with the most modern organization, while the Western Powers, particularly the United States, are endeavouring to make it even larger.

In this situation, what guarantee have you that in the future you will still direct the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, and that one fine day NATO will not become an instrument of the policy of the aggressive circles of the Federal Republic of Germany?

(Mr. V. Šimovič, Czechoslovakia)

At the meeting of the Committee held on 17 May the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, also tried to convince us of the peaceful policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in support of his assertion he said:

"... at the London Conference in 1954 the German Government made a declaration by which it undertook never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany."
(ENDC/PV.133, p.18)

It would be superfluous to repeat here all the revanchist statements made by leading personalities of the Federal Republic of Germany and recall all their concepts, which clearly show that their Government contemplates achieving the aims of its foreign policy by any possible means. The Federal Republic of Germany is the only country whose Government has so far failed to recognize the invalidity of the Munich Agreement and which puts forward territorial claims in regard to its neighbours and seeks to change the frontiers drawn in Europe after the Second World War. These are facts and not fairy-tales.

If the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany were to show in deeds that it favours a peaceful settlement of international problems, particularly those arising from the Second World War; that it supports peaceful co-operation and co-existence; and that it is in favour of general and complete disarmament -- as the Government of the other German State, the German Democratic Republic, is consistently showing in its policy, and convincing evidence of this is the memorandum of the Government of the German Democratic Republic of 5 April 1963 (ENDC/81) --, there would be no need to draw attention to the dangerous course of developments in the Federal Republic of Germany. But so long as this is not the case, the Czechoslovak delegation considers itself to have an inalienable right and a duty to point out in this Committee all the circumstances which might constitute a serious threat to our efforts to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament and to prevent the outbreak of a thermonuclear war.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Before I call on the next speaker, the members of the Committee would, I am sure, wish me as Chairman to welcome to our conference table the distinguished Foreign Secretary of India, Mr. M.J. Desai.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): May I also, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, say what satisfaction it gives us to see the distinguished Foreign Secretary of India sitting with his delegation at our conference table? In this Conference we are very well aware of the many important and helpful contributions which the delegation of India has made to our work; and it is indeed a pleasure that Mr. Desai, in the midst of so many other activities, has found time to be present this morning.

I should like also to say a word or two about the speech which the representative of Romania has made this morning, (supra, pp.5 et seq.), in his customary courteous and moderate language, on the question of the non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States, in the course of which he addressed certain questions to the United Kingdom delegation.

We in the United Kingdom delegation are always greatly impressed by the care with which our Romanian colleague invariably studies not only the observations made here by our delegation but, what is far more important, the statements made from time to time by the leaders of our Government. I think perhaps we owe our Romanian colleague the reciprocal courtesy of studying carefully what he has said to us this morning; and so I shall now limit myself to saying how glad I was that Mr. Macovescu produced some quotations emphasizing the importance which the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom attaches to the settlement of international questions by peaceful negotiations. The fact that Mr. Macovescu went to the trouble of producing those quotations shows, I believe, that he accepts that that is in fact the ~~basic aim of~~ British foreign policy.

I should like this morning to make ~~some comments on~~ the statement made by our Polish colleague on 17 May at the last meeting of our Committee devoted to the question of collateral measures (ENDC/PV.133, pp.26 et seq.). The representative of the United States did refer (supra, p.11) very briefly to Mr. Blusztajn's observations on that occasion; but I think perhaps I should do him the courtesy of examining in somewhat greater detail the arguments which he produced last Friday.

The Committee will recall that on 17 May Mr. Blusztajn set himself the task of replying to the Western criticisms of the Soviet draft declaration on bases (ENDC/75). In particular he attempted (ENDC/PV.133, ibid., p.26) to answer our main objection to that proposal: that it would involve unilateral commitments by the West without any compensating concessions by the Soviet Union.

Mr. Blusztajn first of all produced certain general premises on the strength of which he proceeded to argue that:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"Reciprocity consists above all in the fact that all States parties to a treaty accept identical obligations and enjoy equal rights ..."
(ibid., p.27)

He then went on to argue that --

"... that principle [of reciprocity] is not infringed if, by reason of various causes, the execution of the commitments undertaken involves greater obligations for some of the countries concerned than for others" (ibid.)

I hope Mr. Blusztajn will agree that I have quoted him correctly from the record.

The implication of his argument is that the execution of the commitments involved in this Soviet draft declaration would entail greater obligations for some of the countries concerned than for others -- although according to the formal wording of the declaration itself such commitments would of course be the same for all the countries concerned. I am glad to say that on this point I agree entirely with our Polish colleague. In passing, I should like to point out, however, that he and I do not appear to agree with our Czechoslovak colleague, who this morning argued (supra, p.17), perhaps a little perversely, that in fact the obligations involved would be equal for all the countries. But I am glad to find myself on Mr. Blusztajn's side, and to think that we are both, as we say in English, on the side of the angels in this matter.

I should like to point out, however, that the Soviet proposal not merely would impose greater obligations in practice on the West than on the Soviet Union, but would in fact require unilateral concessions from the West without any compensatory concessions from the Soviet Union.

What I fear I cannot agree with is our Polish colleague's argument that these unequal obligations, however identical they may seem to be on paper, do not in practice infringe the principle of reciprocity. It seems to me that such an argument begs a number of important questions. Clearly true reciprocity, as our Polish colleague himself recognizes, depends on the precise nature of the obligations assumed, on what they would in fact involve for each side, on how the actual concessions are balanced between the two sides, and on what their general effect would be. The principle of reciprocity would obviously not be maintained if one side assumed obligations which did not arise for it in actual practice while the other side assumed obligations which were all too real. To argue otherwise is to believe, for example, that compromise in marriage is to do what your wife says.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Now our Polish colleague (ENDC/PV.133, p.27) prayed in aid of his thesis the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817. It is, of course, true that under that agreement Great Britain withdrew from the Great Lakes a number of warships larger than the number withdrawn by the United States; and it is true also that that withdrawal -- which, as I have said, was asymmetrical in the quantitative sense -- was fully justified in that it led to peace and security in the region concerned. But our Polish colleague, I respectfully suggest, has surely failed to draw at least three obvious lessons from that agreement.

First, both sides -- I repeat, both sides -- had warships on the Great Lakes in the first instance. Secondly, the agreement provided for withdrawals of warships by both sides -- I repeat again, by both sides. Thirdly, such withdrawals did not involve unilateral concessions by either Great Britain or the United States. So I submit that the comparison which our Polish colleague tried to draw between that agreement and the Soviet draft declaration fails on at least three major counts.

Our Polish colleague then tried to develop his argument that the obligations to be undertaken need not be equal in the quantitative sense. He said, for example, that our Eastern colleagues were --

"... firmly convinced that only disarmament obligations which ensure qualitative equality of sacrifice and whose implementation can create conditions in which the parties will enjoy genuine equality of rights benefits ... can take us forward on the road to general and complete disarmament." (ibid., pp.28,29)

I do not understand the relevance of that particular argument to the Soviet draft declaration. To take one example: where is the true equality of rights and benefits of a proposal which demands the dismantling of Western submarine and other bases in Europe and no compensatory concessions by the Soviet Union? Where is the true equality of rights and benefits in a proposal which demands the withdrawal from foreign ports of Western aircraft carriers having on board aircraft armed with nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union, which has no aircraft carriers itself, would not be affected in any way? Where is the true equality of rights and benefits in a proposal which demands the dismantling of all Western strategic rocket and aircraft installations on so-called foreign territory, while some 700 medium-range ballistic missiles are left intact on Soviet territory aimed at and threatening the whole of Western Europe? I do not believe that our Polish colleague can seriously contend that proposals such as those would ensure equality of obligations in the qualitative sense.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Our Czechoslovak colleague asked us this morning (supra, p.18) why we continued to be so obdurate in opposing this Soviet proposal. Let me try to explain to him, quite simply, why. The Committee will remember that the Soviet delegation circulated on 17 April a note (ENDC/84) on NATO military policy dated 8 April, which was addressed to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany with copies to the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I am going to take a few moments of the Committee's time, without any apology for so doing, to read into the record a certain number of sentences from the reply which Her Majesty's Government sent to that note on 18 May, because I believe that by doing so I can express in far better words than I could choose for myself why it is that we are bound to remain obdurate on this point. This is what I wish to read:

"In their note the Soviet Government take occasion to complain of NATO's defensive planning in Europe....The immediate reason is not far to seek. The Soviet Government have, for several years, proclaimed that they were targeting nuclear weapons on Western Europe, whose countries, it is alleged, could be completely destroyed by a Soviet attack. Indeed, Her Majesty's Government are aware that deployed in the Soviet Union are more than 700 medium and intermediate range nuclear missiles, the bulk of which are ranged against the United Kingdom and her continental allies. The 20 Soviet divisions in the Soviet zone of Germany are maintained at a high state of readiness. There is a total of about 100 Soviet line divisions in the Western areas of the USSR and Eastern Europe. These troops are supported with large numbers of tactical nuclear missiles and bombers....It is unacceptable that the Soviet Union should regard itself as privileged to deploy nuclear weapons in positions which threaten the cities of Western Europe, while at the same time maintaining that reciprocal measures of defence cannot properly be taken by the members of NATO." (ENDC/89, p.2)

I hope that will explain to our Czechoslovak colleague why we are compelled to maintain our attitude of opposition to this proposal.

In conclusion, I am content to leave it to the Committee to judge whether the unstable and potentially dangerous situation which would be created by putting into force the Soviet draft declaration would, as our Polish colleague alleged on 17 May, "help to reduce international tension, increase confidence between the great Powers and military blocs..." (ENDC/PV.133, p.29).

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Our Czechoslovak colleague this morning (supra, p.17) reproached the West for having been unwilling to examine the text of the Soviet proposal. As he was not here on that occasion, perhaps I might suggest that he takes time to read carefully the statement made by my leader, Mr. Godber, on 29 March (ENDC/PV.115, pp.34 et seq.). In that statement -- to which none of our Eastern European colleagues has been able to give any convincing reply -- Mr. Godber took apart the Soviet draft, article by article, line after line, and showed in convincing detail how an unstable and potentially dangerous situation would be created in Europe precisely because this Soviet draft declaration would deprive Western Europe of its legitimate means of defence against a manifest threat posed by missiles in western Russia, and would at the same time affect not a single weapon in the whole Soviet armoury. In my submission such a situation would not be in the collective interest of the international community which our Polish colleague went to such trouble to stress last Friday, and it would not help to maintain peace in the world.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): First, I should like to associate myself with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the United Kingdom representative in extending a welcome to Mr. Desai. I consider his presence here a further proof of the Indian Government's great interest in our negotiations. There is no need to say how much we have always appreciated the Indian delegation's contribution to our work.

I should like to devote my statement today to a few remarks on the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. In doing so I shall endeavour to avoid polemics and confine myself strictly to facts. I am very well aware that there can be no unanimity among us in the assessment of our respective policies. The Polish delegation has already had occasion to express its opinion of the policy pursued by the Atlantic Treaty Powers, and I do not intend to repeat it. I know that my words have not convinced my Western colleagues, just as I hope that the representatives of Italy, Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom also understand that their protests are not enough to convince us that the military measures taken by their governments are merely an expression of their peaceful intentions.

It seems to me, however, that, whatever our judgment of each other's policies, our task is to seek together, on the basis of objective facts, solutions to the problems which, whatever the differences dividing us, are of common interest. Some

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

of our colleagues have been hitherto mainly engaged in an exercise whose main purpose was to find arguments justifying the arms race. I think that it is time to examine together the reasons for putting an end to that race, and it is to the consideration of that problem that I should like to make my modest contribution.

No one can deny that one of the main reasons for the present tension in international relations is the trend towards the dissemination of nuclear weapons. That trend is explained by a series of facts both technological and political. The development of nuclear science and technology, the perfecting of new methods of producing fissile materials and equipment for their production, the proliferation throughout the world of atomic reactors, and the growing interest in the use of atomic energy for the production of power, are bringing us closer to the time when more and more countries will possess the technical means for the construction of nuclear devices.

I should like to make myself quite clear. Poland has always been in favour of ever greater utilization of scientific discoveries in the atomic field for peaceful purposes. The use of the atom in the service of mankind can have far-reaching economic and social consequences; it can hasten the development of the under-developed countries; it can help to promote progress and general well-being. Poland has always declared itself in favour of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. We take an active part in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and we have concluded many bilateral agreements on co-operation in the atomic field with other countries.

The development of atomic science and technology must therefore be encouraged by every possible means. However, we should be aware of the fact that, in an unfavourable political atmosphere and in conditions characterized by the arms race and international tension, such a development may turn against the interests of all mankind. The very logic of the arms race stimulates the proliferation of nuclear weapons. One discovery leads to another; the perfecting of a new weapon inevitably provokes research for an effective means of countering it, and so on. The arms race is enmeshing more and more countries. We have had a recent example in the centrifugal trends that are emerging in the Atlantic alliance and favouring the creation of "national striking forces".

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Polish delegation considers that all possible measures must be taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are entitled to assert that this desire is shared by world public opinion and enjoys the support of most governments. One need only refer to the discussions at recent sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and study, inter alia, the replies (DC/201/Add.2; DC/204/Add.1) sent by many countries to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, following the inquiry made under the Unden plan (see A/C.1/L.297 and Add.1,2; A/RES/1664(XVI)).

We cannot but share the concern expressed by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, who at his Press conference on 22 March declared:

"... by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be ten nuclear Powers instead of four, and by 1975 fifteen or twenty.... I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard."

We can only hope that the President of the United States will draw all the necessary conclusions from this alarming realization.

The problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons may be solved in several ways. The best and most effective would undoubtedly be the conclusion of an international agreement on general and complete disarmament. We think, however, that in view of the complexity of the task it is our duty to seek means of achieving the same objective through the application of so-called collateral measures. For we can act in regard to the various factors that favour the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The measures we can adopt are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they are complementary and their joint application could reduce to a minimum the dangers this process represents for world peace.

First we can consider the conclusion of an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. While I do not propose to dwell now on that means of solving the problem which confronts us, I think that one comment is called for. The Polish delegation takes the view that the principle of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is quite irreconcilable with the concept of so-called multilateral or multinational forces, which under various guises would make nuclear weapons available to countries which do not yet possess them. We cannot accept the argument that such forces would be an effective means of preventing the establishment of so-called "national" nuclear forces. In particular we cannot accept this argument when it is

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

applied to the Federal Republic of Germany, which stops at nothing to equip its army -- which is an instrument of its policy of revenge -- with the most powerful weapons.

We can also envisage an agreement whereby countries would abandon the production or acquisition of nuclear weapons. This is a measure, among others, provided for in resolution 1665 (XVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth session.

We can go further, and envisage an undertaking which would not only exclude the formation of so-called "national" nuclear forces but would prohibit the stationing of foreign troops equipped with atomic weapons in the territories of the countries concerned. That is the concept embodied in the Under plan.

Finally, we can conceive the creation in different parts of the world of nuclear-free zones. It can, I think, be claimed that this idea of the denuclearization of entire zones is receiving wider and wider support. It found expression in the 1959 Convention on the Antarctic. It was sanctioned by the United Nations General Assembly in its adoption on 24 November 1961 of the well known resolution on the denuclearization of Africa (A/RES/1652(XVI)). It has its supporters in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, the Pacific region and Latin America.

The plans for creating denuclearized zones enjoy such wide support because they take account in equal measure of the individual security of States and collective security interests. This was rightly pointed out in the Committee by the Nigerian representative, Mr. Mbu, who said at the meeting held on 6 May:

"First, the trend towards denuclearization clearly constitutes a manifestation of States in self-defence against the perpetual subjugation of human destiny to the risk of an accidental nuclear war. Secondly, the trend towards denuclearization is supported because the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world could contribute considerably towards the relaxation of international tension and facilitate the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament."

(ENDC/PV.128, p.19)

The Polish delegation is well aware that the establishment of denuclearized zones is no easy task. Difficulties will doubtless be less in regions where there are still no nuclear weapons, greater where the nuclear weapon already exists. This situation must naturally be taken into account in discussing the denuclearization methods it is intended to apply. We well understand that the central European region, important

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

as it is for world peace, raises its own special problems; for there the two military groups -- the countries members of the Warsaw Treaty and the countries members of the Atlantic alliance stand face to face. There is concentrated the most modern military equipment, including atomic weapons. That region is of great strategic importance to both parties. It is the focus of political differences that have their repercussions on the general political situation.

We fully realize that all these facts compel the application of special denuclearization methods, and we bore that in mind in the proposal submitted last year to the Committee by the Polish delegation on the establishment of a denuclearized zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). We proposed, you will remember, that our plan should be carried out in two stages. In the first stage we should have halted the process of increasing the nuclear potential already concentrated in the territories of the zone concerned. Only in the second stage would there have been denuclearization in the strict sense of the word. The denuclearization measure would also have been accompanied by an appreciable reduction in conventional arms under strict international control.

The Polish delegation considers this stage-by-stage method to be the best way of solving the problems connected with the denuclearization of regions where there is already a high concentration of nuclear weapons. It takes account of international realities; it expresses a desire not to cut corners; its first aim is to stop a movement and then to create conditions for reversing the trend.

We had the proof at the last session of the General Assembly that this concern is shared by other countries. May I here quote a passage from the statement by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Nilsson, which I find very much to the point? Mr. Nilsson said:

(continued in English)

"We must try to give to the house of disarmament a solid foundation so that it can weather temporary political storms even if it is only partially finished. For this purpose we wish to stress that the greatest importance should now be attached to the first few steps, to stage I according to the draft treaties, or even to what might be called 'pre-stage I measures'.

"In this spirit, the Swedish Government would find it most promising, because most realistic, if the disarmament measures first to be devised, and first to be initiated, aimed at the preliminary objective to stop the increase of armaments before we can start the decrease of armaments. If we are not able to achieve a freezing of the present situation, how could we hope even to begin to divest all our nations of their present arsenals?"

(A/C.1/PV.1270.p.12)

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

(continued in French)

The importance of this affirmation -- particularly in regard to the idea of establishing denuclearized zones -- must be clear to all. It confirms the views inspiring the Rapacki plan, (A/PV.697, para. 136) and refutes the argument that the atomic arms race is the best means of safeguarding peace.

The Polish delegation has of course special reason to be gratified at the progress that the denuclearization idea has made throughout the world. We welcomed here the initiative of the five Presidents of Latin-American republics on the denuclearization of their part of the world (ENDC/87), and we also welcome and warmly support the recent proposal of the Government of the Soviet Union for the denuclearization of the Mediterranean region (ENDC/91).

There can be no doubt that the putting into effect of the various proposals for denuclearization submitted by different governments can contribute to the realization of the idea of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. They therefore merit the support of all members of the Committee, and my delegation hopes that we shall shortly have an opportunity here for a detailed discussion on the substance of the question.

I should now like to say a few words about the statement of the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason. I am very grateful to him for having so carefully studied my statement of last Friday. I should also like to have a chance to study his statement of this morning before commenting on it. But I think that on one point he was the victim of a mistake in interpretation. What I did say in my statement was:

"...there is no derogation from this principle if for various reasons the fulfilment of pledges given involves some countries in greater sacrifice than others." (ENDC/PV.133, p.27)

In the English provisional translation of this sentence, which is a key sentence in my statement, the word "prestations" becomes "obligations" -- a term which has a much broader meaning, particularly in the context of my argument.

I repeat that I should like to have a chance to study Sir Paul Mason's statement in the record and to comment on it at next Friday's meeting.

Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): Before beginning, I wish on behalf of the Bulgarian delegation to greet Mr. Desai's presence among us, and I gladly associate myself with all the words of welcome addressed to him.

I propose today to make a few remarks on two items of our agenda: the establishment of denuclearized zones in different regions of the world, and measures to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The new proposal by the Government of the Soviet Union (ENDC/91) that the whole Mediterranean region be declared a denuclearized zone gives new topical interest to these questions. Representing a country situated in the immediate vicinity of the Mediterranean littoral, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria has particular reason to give its full attention to this Soviet proposal, and reserves the right to revert to it in due course.

The idea of establishing denuclearized zones arose from the desire to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict in certain sensitive areas. Because of the trend towards the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the idea of nuclear-free zones has since broadened, has taken on new aspects, and, while retaining its original content, has developed considerably. It has been adopted and recognized by several countries and has attracted wide support throughout the world. In recent years the governments of various countries have submitted proposals and plans for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in central Europe, in the Balkans and the Adriatic, on the African continent, etc.

The idea itself and the concrete proposals based on it have been discussed at length in all international forums, and especially in the United Nations General Assembly. In these discussions two aspects of the problems raised have, in our view, attracted special attention.

First, the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the stationing on foreign territory of vehicles for their delivery, far from guaranteeing security, are a danger in themselves and increase risks and insecurity for the various countries. That being so, creating a nuclear-free zone is one way of reducing threats to security and the risks of military conflicts.

Secondly, the dissemination of nuclear weapons is at the present time one of the most immediate dangers; in many ways it embodies the nuclear danger. Many countries, indeed vast regions of the world, are seeking shelter from the nuclear danger through the establishment of denuclearized zones.

So there is a very close link between the creation of nuclear-free zones and the peoples' desire for protection from the dissemination of nuclear weapons. The establishment of such zones is designed to eliminate the danger where it already exists

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by removing from the territories concerned the actual cause of the danger: nuclear weapons. Where it does not exist, the aim is to apply prophylactic measures, in other words to avert the danger by taking steps against its appearance -- that is to say, against the spread of nuclear weapons by the same means: the creation of denuclearized zones.

The adoption of measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bound to promote peace and help to avert the threat of a thermonuclear war. The more countries there are possessing these weapons, the more difficult it will be to take the necessary steps to prohibit and completely destroy them, hence to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament as a whole. Unless we can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the difficulties and the danger will undoubtedly become vastly greater.

This is the attitude determining the position of principle adopted by the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and by our delegation, both at the sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and in our Committee, with regard to any measure to create denuclearized zones and prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The Bulgarian Government welcomed and supported the declaration on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (A/C.1/L.254 and Add.1-3) submitted by a group of African and Asian countries and adopted by the General Assembly, under which the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the principles of international law and to the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter. The Bulgarian delegation has also supported the repeated proposals of the Irish Government (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1; A/C.1/L.298 and Rev.1) for ending the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and other similar proposals.

At the sixteenth session of the General Assembly the Bulgarian delegation gave its unreserved support to the proposal of the African States (A/C.1/L.291/Rev.1 and Add.1-3) that Africa be regarded as a denuclearized zone and respected as such, and that States refrain from using the territory of Africa to test, manufacture, stockpile or transport nuclear weapons.

At the same session of the General Assembly our delegation voted for resolution 1664 (XVI), the essence of which -- according to the explanations of its sponsor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden -- was to create denuclearized zones, the countries concerned assuming precise commitments and concluding agreements to that end.

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The declaration (ENDC/87) of the five countries of Latin America on the denuclearization of that continent which was put before the Committee at our meeting on 6 May by the delegations of Brazil and Mexico (ENDC/PV.128), is further proof of the growing interest of peoples and governments in the idea of creating denuclearized zones.

Nevertheless, without wishing to underestimate the scope and value of the establishment of denuclearized zones in any region, we think that their creation is of special importance for certain regions that are highly sensitive in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this respect we fully share the views expressed by other delegations, and in particular the opinion and the appeal of the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Mikail Imru, who, referring on 6 May to the initiative of the five Latin-American countries, said:

"Also, our delegation ventures to hope that the example of this declaration will be followed by other governments, especially in certain sensitive areas where nuclear weapons already exist." (ibid., p.23)

On the same lines, I do not think it necessary to refute the objections expressed in this connexion by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, also on 6 May. Mr. Godber accepts (ibid., p.26) although reluctantly, the establishment of denuclearized zones in regions where there is less tension, but considers that they cannot be created in sensitive areas of the world before the conclusion of an agreement on disarmament -- which is the same as saying that it would be better to set up a fire service in a cement factory than in a cotton mill.

There are proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in the most critical regions of the world, which, by virtue of an "historical tradition", are still situated in or around Europe. Our Conference has had submitted to it by the Polish Government a detailed plan for the establishment of a denuclearized and limited armaments zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). The Bulgarian Government attaches great importance to the carrying out of this plan. There can be no doubt that the implementation of such a measure in that region of the world would most effectively help to relax international tension and to lessen the risk of nuclear war.

With the same ideas in mind, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria supported (A/PV.875, para. 91) the Soviet Government's proposal of 25 June 1959 to transform the region of the Balkans and the Adriatic into a zone free from nuclear weapons and missiles. That proposal was supported from the rostrum of the United Nations, at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, by the head of the Bulgarian delegation, Mr. Todor Jivkov, President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

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We have already referred to General Assembly resolution 1652 (XVI) on the denuclearization of the African continent. That resolution expresses, as was so well put by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Mr. Yifru, at our meeting on 21 March 1962: "...the desire of the world to prevent the transformation of all regions into nuclear arsenals" (ENDC/PV.6, p.18). Quite recently, when the declaration of the five Latin-American countries concerning the transformation of Latin America into a denuclearized zone was submitted, the representative of Nigeria described this universal desire as a means of self-defence (ENDC/PV.128, p.19).

One need only read over the records of the First Committee at the General Assembly's seventeenth session to realize how impressive is the number of delegations which, during the discussion on disarmament, stressed the importance their governments attached to measures for warding off the danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and that priority in that connexion was unanimously given to the creation of denuclearized zones.

Only a few days ago the Brazilian representative quoted a message from President J. Goulart, who said:

"We consider the trend towards the dissemination of nuclear weapons as one of the most disturbing and threatening features of the international crisis."
(ibid., p.11)

It will be recalled that in that message the President of Brazil appeals to all the governments of Latin America to associate themselves with the declaration of the five States of that continent proclaiming Latin America a denuclearized zone.

In his statement of 12 March 1962, from which I have already quoted, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Mr. Yifru, asked the Committee to invite the major nuclear Powers to implement the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. He said:

"This is another area where a practical step can be taken by this Committee. We strongly recommend that this Committee call upon the major nuclear Powers to declare their acceptance of this resolution."
(ENDC/PV.6, p.18)

Less than two years after the United Nations General Assembly voted the resolutions I have just mentioned recommending the establishment of denuclearized zones and recognizing that measure as a most effective means of preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the NATO Powers have been displaying feverish activity in a direction diametrically opposed to those recommendations. They have adopted arbitrary unilateral measures of unprecedented scope, in flagrant contradiction with the spirit and the letter of the United Nations resolutions; and the inevitable result of those measures is the dissemination of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

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You will, I hope, recall that in the United Nations General Assembly only the United States and some of its NATO allies did not vote for the resolutions recommending the creation of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world. Only the delegations of these countries displayed in their statements ill-disguised hostility to such proposals. Recent events demonstrate that this attitude of theirs was not fortuitous.

One of the most dangerous elements in their policy of disseminating nuclear weapons is precisely the introduction into the Mediterranean of submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. This decision by the United States Government undoubtedly creates a new and serious threat to the peace and security of many countries, by the very fact that the Polaris missile is pre-eminently an "anti-city" missile, and therefore a purely offensive missile -- if we accept the Western experts' views on the subject. Consequently, this United States decision aggravates tension in that part of the world. This "pollution" of Mediterranean waters cannot but arouse feelings of anxiety among the inhabitants of countries bordering the Mediterranean.

The countries around the Mediterranean have a population of more than 300 million spread over fourteen countries, five of them in Africa. Only four of these fourteen countries are members of NATO; but it is NATO which by a unilateral decision has introduced Polaris missiles into the Mediterranean. So the fact is that some ten countries which were spared the dissemination of nuclear weapons are now involved in NATO's military and nuclear preparations. It follows that the nuclear danger has spread to new areas. Can this really be claimed as a contribution to improving the situation? It cannot be asserted that the countries which do not belong to NATO are running no risk. These countries -- the great majority in the Mediterranean region -- will in fact, as is pointed out in the Soviet note of 20 May to which I have referred (ENDC/91), be at the mercy of the commanders of the atomic submarines.

It is not only a matter of possible -- and probable -- violations of these countries' territorial waters by Polaris-equipped submarines, which would constitute a violation of the spirit and letter of the resolution proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone (A/RES/1652 (XVI)). There is also the fact that in any conflict that may occur the Mediterranean countries which do not belong to NATO will inevitably have to suffer the consequences of an equally inevitable counter-attack.

Whatever is said, whatever attempt is made to justify it, the fact remains that the introduction of Polaris missiles into the Mediterranean is tantamount to the dissemination

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of nuclear weapons. It is a new proof of the arms race and a further demonstration of the policy pursued by the United States and its allies of drawing other countries into the atomic mosh and extending the risks and dangers of a thermonuclear conflict to new regions. This step taken by the NATO countries at a time when many countries and whole continents are seeking to free themselves from the threat of nuclear war and to proclaim themselves nuclear-free zones means the creation, against the will of the peoples, of new nuclearized zones and the extension of those already in existence.

Mr. DESAI (India): I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the representatives of the United Kingdom, Poland and Bulgaria for commenting on my temporary presence in the Committee, and for your kind references to the work of the Indian delegation the credit for which must go to my colleagues who have participated actively throughout. I am grateful also to all the delegations here for the generous and constant co-operation and kindness shown to my colleagues in the work of this Committee.

It is for me a matter of great personal regret that I have not been able to participate more actively in the Committee's work because of our preoccupation with the situation created by the challenge from one of our neighbours to the very principles of peace, the peaceful settlement of international differences and peaceful coexistence, which I would distinguish from mere existence -- principles which have been accepted by the international community as a whole and which constitute the fundamental bases of the task entrusted to this Committee by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-sixth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Stolle, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Romania, the United States, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, Poland, Bulgaria and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Monday, 27 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.